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Is health care “special”? That is, do we have moral reason to treat 
health care differently from how we treat other sorts of social 
goods? Intuitively, perhaps, we might think the proper response is 
“yes.” However, to date, philosophers have often struggled to justify 
this idea—known as the “specialness thesis about health care” or 
STHC. In this article, I offer a new justification of STHC, one I take 
to be immune from objections that have undercut other defenses. 
Notably, unlike previous utility- and opportunity-based theories, 
I argue that we can find normative justification for STHC in what 
I term our special duty to assist those unable to help themselves. It 
is this duty, I argue, that ultimately gives us reason to treat health 
care differently from other sorts of goods (even other goods meeting 
health needs) and to distribute it independently of individuals’ 
ability to pay.
Keywords: Daniels, duty to assist, health care, health needs, 
special, specialness thesis about health care
I. INTRODUCTION
Why fund health care through public taxation? Why not have a system 
whereby everyone’s access to health care is dependent solely on their ability 
to pay? After all, this is the way we tend to treat other kinds of goods, even 
other kinds of social goods.
One common response to these kinds of questions, perhaps, is to say that 
there is something “special” about health care—that we have certain moral 
obligations with respect to health care that we do not with regards to most 
other kinds of goods and that one of the things these obligations entail is 








p/article/46/3/272/6295414 by guest on 16 August 2021
that we ensure individuals can access health care irrespective of their pos-
session of this or that other social good (wealth in particular).
Put this way, this kind of claim—typically referred to as “the specialness 
thesis about health care” or STHC—might seem fairly modest. STHC does 
not assert that health care is the most important or chief good (cf., Segall, 
2007; Rumbold, 2017), nor that it is necessarily more important than any 
other good. To claim that health care is special is also not necessarily to 
claim that it is uniquely special. It may well be that a number of other goods 
are special for precisely the same reasons health care is or that there are 
other goods that are special for reasons entirely different from those that 
make health care special (specialness theses not being mutually exclusive). 
Instead, the thesis—as it is understood here—only asserts:
 (i) that there are at least some moral obligations we are under in virtue of 
which we are required to provide health care,
 (ii) that the same obligations do not require similar provision of other 
goods; and
 (iii) that at least one of the things such obligations entail is that we distribute 
health care independently of individuals’ ability to pay.1
For all its apparent modesty, however, STHC has been met with rising scep-
ticism by the philosophical community. For some writers, of course, we 
never had any reason for thinking health care was special to begin with.2 
More damning, though, is that even those who once advocated STHC—most 
notably Norman Daniels—have now largely abandoned it. To be clear: such 
writers do not deny that health care is special. Rather, they argue that the 
specialness thesis is better understood as covering all goods meeting health 
needs, as opposed to just health care (Daniels, 2008, 29–30).3 Such a set, 
then, comprises goods traditionally understood as healthcare goods, which 
is to say, all those goods and services normally covered by a comprehensive 
public health service (cf. Daniels, 2008). However, it is also taken to cover 
any other good or service that reduces the incidence of disease and disability 
someone may experience over the course of their life; a set that, following 
recent discoveries in social epidemiology, looks like it would encompass a 
somewhat dizzying array of items (including goods and services relating to 
housing and one’s living environment; one’s working environment; trans-
port; the labor market; agriculture and food; water and sanitation; social 
care; education, and so on—cf. Bambra et al., 2009).
Much of the reasoning that has led us to this position would appear 
sound. Certainly, insofar as we attribute any moral significance to individ-
uals’ health needs in general, it would appear to have implications for how 
we distribute any good meeting health needs, rather than just healthcare 
goods. (Following Wilson, 2009, once we accept this, we might wonder 
whether there is much to be gained by continuing to describe such goods as 
“special.”) However, if the conclusion that we are meant to draw from this 
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is that there is no difference between our duties with regard to the provision 
of health care and our duties with regard to the provision of other goods 
meeting health needs (defined following Daniels’ definitions above), then 
I think that conclusion would be mistaken. Rather, in this article, I argue that 
we still have certain duties with respect to the provision of health care that 
we do not with respect to other kinds of goods, even other goods meeting 
health needs. Moreover, I also attempt to show that one of the things such 
duties entail is that we ought to distribute health care independently of in-
dividuals’ ability to pay. In effect, that there is still a sense in which health 
care is “special.”
My argument here ultimately rests on analysis of the kinds of predicament 
faced by those who require healthcare interventions and how these affect 
our ordinary duties to assist. Specifically, I argue that because those experi-
encing what I call an “actual”—as opposed to “potential”—health need are 
rendered less able to help themselves, we have reasons to lend them our 
assistance over and above any reasons we would have otherwise. We have 
a “special” duty to assist. Now it is this special duty to assist that I claim jus-
tifies our treatment of health care as a “special” good.4
The article is structured as follows. In Section II, I begin by putting our 
present discussion into its proper context by exploring some of the ways in 
which writers have sought to justify STHC in the past and why such accounts 
are often taken to fail. In Section III, I  then lay some of the groundwork 
for the present justification of STHC by distinguishing between individuals’ 
actual and potential health needs. In Section IV, I set out the normative sig-
nificance of this distinction, explaining why we might think we have certain 
“special” duties to assist with regard to individuals’ actual health needs that 
we do not with respect to their potential health needs. In Section V, I explain 
how our special duty to assist those with actual health needs generates the 
claim that health care is special. In Section VI, I reply to some possible ob-
jections. I conclude in Section VII.
Before we get into the meat of the article, however, there are a couple 
of limitations to this argument it is worth highlighting. First, as intimated 
above, one of the ways the justification of STHC I offer here differs from 
those that have gone before is that rather than looking to ground STHC on, 
say, a principle of utility, or Rawlsian principle of fair equality of oppor-
tunity, my account justifies STHC on the basis of a moral duty to assist and, 
in particular, our “special” duty to assist those unable to help themselves. 
However, while I spend some time establishing why the fact that individuals 
are unable to help themselves generates a special duty to assist, one thing 
I do not do here is defend the idea that, in general, we have a duty to as-
sist those experiencing, or at risk of, harm (primarily for reasons of space). 
This is a significant limitation to the present argument—principally because 
it leaves it vulnerable to anyone who might deny we have any such duty in 
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and take this to be a feature of a wide range of ethical theories, for any who 
are less sympathetic to this idea, one way to understand this article might be 
as something of a hypothetical: that is, assuming we have a general duty to 
assist those experiencing, or at risk of, some harm, do we have a reason to 
think that health care is special? To which I argue: yes.
Another limitation of this article is that, although, as stated in the introduc-
tion, STHC is often taken as the first step toward justifying a publicly funded 
health system, the extent to which the present justification of STHC entails 
that we ought to fund health care through public taxation is not something 
I discuss here. Rather, my main aim here is simply to get clear on the nature 
of our moral obligations with regard to the provision of health care. The 
further question of how we ought to fund health care, given those obliga-
tions—whether by public taxation, charitable donation, or some other mech-
anism—is something I leave to another time.
II. EXISTING JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE SPECIALNESS  
THESIS ABOUT HEALTH CARE
To help explain the need for a new justification of STHC, and to highlight 
some of the possible pitfalls such a theory may encounter, it is helpful, per-
haps, to revisit past defenses of STHC and consider why such theories have 
either failed or ballooned well beyond their original purpose.
Why, then, might we think that we have a different set of duties with re-
gard to the provision of health care than we do with respect to other kinds 
of social goods? One thought we might offer here could be to point to the 
moral value of life itself. On this line of thinking, then, the reason we ought 
to treat health care as a special good is because health care saves lives and, 
given a prior duty to save whatever lives we can, we ought to distribute 
health care independently of individuals’ ability to pay. Here, though, we 
face an obvious problem. Not all healthcare goods—indeed, maybe not even 
the majority of healthcare goods—do save lives, nor are they designed to. 
Thus, the justification is too narrow; it fails to justify the specialness of even 
a majority of healthcare goods, justifying instead only the specialness of a 
small subset of such goods—namely, those by which we might save lives.
Another possible justification for STHC is offered by Lawrence Stern and, 
latterly, Thomas Schramme. For Stern, what makes health care different from 
other kinds of goods is its “indisputable” utility in mitigating the “severe mis-
fortunes” of “death . . . pain and disability” (1983, 346). Schramme (2009) 
makes a similar point, writing that if we want to justify the specialness of 
health care, we need only look to the pain and harm of disease and disability.
However, the problem here is that, while these arguments capture a prop-
erty shared by almost all healthcare goods, they fail to identify one that suf-
ficiently differentiates healthcare goods from any other social good. After all, 
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almost all social goods could be said to have some sort of effect on pain or 
suffering (or pleasure or well-being). As such, it seems difficult to see why 
we ought to mark out health care as especially special, given the specialness 
we might attribute to health care could also be attributed to a vast range of 
other goods. Instead of being too narrow, then, justifications like Stern’s and 
Schramme’s look too wide; they make too many social goods special along 
with health care.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, another possible justification of STHC 
was offered by Norman Daniels, this time from fair equality of opportunity. 
Now, as mentioned in the introduction, in recent years Daniels has revised 
his position on STHC, such that he now holds that all goods meeting health 
needs are special, rather than simply health care. However, since both his 
original theory and the reasons why it failed are relevant to our present dis-
cussion, it is worth spending a brief moment considering it here.
Originally, Daniels defended health care’s specialness on the grounds of 
its contribution to what he termed our “normal opportunity range,” which is 
to say, the range of opportunities one would normally expect to have, given 
one’s particular society and set of talents (1981, 159). In motivating this view, 
Daniels started from four claims: first, that disease and disability constitute 
an impairment to our normal, or “species-typical,” functioning5; second, that 
such an impairment constitutes a “fundamental restriction” on our “indi-
vidual opportunity” relative to our “normal opportunity range”; third, that 
one of the central effects of health care is to prevent or moderate those 
diseases and disabilities that constitute such an impairment; and fourth, that 
health care’s contribution in this respect is significant (1981, 159). From this, 
Daniels concluded that all those goods traditionally recognized as healthcare 
goods might be seen to share a distinctive feature: namely, their strategic im-
portance for protecting the range of opportunities one can pursue relative to 
others within one’s particular society. On this basis, Daniels claimed that, in-
sofar as we have any interest in defending equality of opportunity—Daniels 
himself supporting a Rawlsian principle of fair equality of opportunity (cf. 
Rawls, 1999)—we ought to treat health care as a special good.
At first glance, perhaps the main advantage Daniels’ theory enjoyed over 
its competitors was that it was neither too narrow nor too wide. By tying 
health care’s moral significance to its contribution to our health—and, in turn, 
health’s significance to its importance with regard to our opportunities—
Daniels’ defense appeared to identify a property shared by all healthcare 
goods but not shared by many others.
However, by the late 1990s and early 2000s, this aspect of Daniels’ thesis 
came under increasing pressure; not, incidentally, from any philosoph-
ical argument, but primarily from new research in social epidemiology. 
Significantly, none of this research threatened Daniel’s contention that health 
care helps alleviate disease and disability when they occur. However, such 
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incidence of disability and disease, as experienced by any given individual 
over his lifetime. More important, according to such work, are health’s “so-
cial determinants”: our social and psychological environment, environment 
in early childhood, working environment, unemployment and job insecurity, 
friendships and social cohesion, social exclusion, effects of alcohol and other 
drugs, access to healthy food, sanitation, education, and so on.
Thus, if we assumed—as Daniels did—that what makes certain goods 
special was their ability to prevent those diseases and disabilities that consti-
tute an impairment to our normal opportunity range, then, strictly speaking, 
STHC entailed that a far greater range of goods were special than simply 
health care. Rather, all those goods relating to health’s social determinants—
goods like education, housing, and sanitation—should also be recognized 
as “special.”
To his great credit, Daniels was quick both to recognize the force of this 
objection (later termed the “social determinants of health objection,” Peter, 
2001; Segall, 2007, 2010; Hurley, 2007, 328), and to amend his theory. Thus, 
abandoning a traditional formulation of STHC, Daniels now claims that all 
those goods that meet health needs are special. This latter set is taken to in-
clude health care but also any good or service that reduces the incidence of 
disease and disability; most notably, all those goods and services by which 
we might tackle the social determinants of health (Daniels, 2008, 29–30).
III. ACTUAL HEALTH NEEDS AND POTENTIAL HEALTH NEEDS
Working from the foregoing section, one conclusion we might reason-
ably reach is that there is no good reason for thinking we ought to treat 
health care differently from other sorts of goods—or, if we are persuaded 
by Daniels’ revised thesis, no good reason for thinking we ought to treat 
health care differently from any other good meeting health needs (of which 
it now appears there are rather a lot). As suggested in the introduction, this 
appears the view of most philosophers working in this field. However, while 
I am inclined to agree with many of the objections people have put to past 
justifications of STHC, I think we would be wrong to conclude that STHC is 
unjustifiable. Rather, I think we do have certain obligations with regard to 
the provision of health care that we do not with respect to other kinds of 
goods, even other goods meeting health needs, and as such there is a sense 
in which health care is “special.”
In one way, the justification of STHC I lay out here is similar to Daniels’ 
in that it starts from a certain reading of the normative significance of indi-
viduals’ health needs. Like Daniels, I adopt a Boorsian conception of health 
as an absence of pathology, with “pathology” understood as a harmful de-
parture from normal or “species-typical” functioning (cf. Boorse, 1975, 1997). 
Moreover, like Daniels (2008, 37), by “health needs” I understand deviations 
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from normal functioning that require intervention. However, where Daniels 
treats all health needs as morally on a par, I want to suggest that our duties 
with respect to some health needs are different from our duties with respect 
to others. Specifically, I want to suggest that there is a distinction we can 
make here between (a) our duties with respect to those pathologies (re-
quiring correction) that an individual is presently experiencing (what I call 
an individual’s actual health needs) and (b) our duties with respect to those 
pathologies (requiring correction) that an individual is not presently experi-
encing but which certain features of the present situation put at risk of ex-
periencing in the future (what I call an individual’s potential health needs).
In the rest of this section, I explicate further the nature of the distinction 
between our actual and potential health needs. In Section IV, I  then ex-
plain how our duties stand with respect to each kind of need and thus the 
distinction’s normative significance.
Put as it is above, the distinction between actual and potential health 
needs might seem fairly intuitive. That is, we appear to be able to easily 
distinguish between situations where we are presently experiencing a par-
ticular pathology (actual health need); those where we are not experiencing 
that pathology but nonetheless are at risk of experiencing it at some point 
in the future (potential health need); and, those where we are not experien-
cing such a pathology, nor are at risk of experiencing it at some point in the 
future (no health need in respect of that particular pathology). For example, 
at present, I do not have a broken leg. If I did have a broken leg, though, 
I would be experiencing an actual health need: that is, I would be experi-
encing pathology—a deviation from normal functioning—that requires cor-
rection. Similarly, insofar as my leg is not broken, I am not experiencing 
that actual health need. However, my not having a broken leg is ambiguous 
between two possible states of affairs. On the one hand, it may be that I do 
not have a broken leg, nor am I at risk of breaking my leg, in which case it 
seems clear I do not have a health need with respect to broken legs what-
soever. On the other hand, however, it may be that I do not have a broken 
leg at present, but I am at risk of breaking my leg, which is to say, that there 
are features of my present situation that make it possible that I may break 
my leg at some point in the future. It might be, for example, that I happen 
to work in a building with a particularly slippery set of steps leading up to 
the front door. In these kinds of cases, it is true that I do not have an actual 
health need but I do have a potential health need, that is, I am at risk of ex-
periencing a particular pathology in the future (a broken leg), even though 
I may not actually be experiencing it at present.
In respect to these kinds of cases, then, the distinction between actual 
and potential health needs can look fairly sharp. However, there are certain 
situations that might give us pause. For example, how ought we to classify 
those who are currently healthy (i.e., whose condition at the present time 
T
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process of falling ill (i.e., whose condition is declining over time in such 
a way that it is inevitable that, without intervention, it will fall outside the 
bounds of normal functioning)? Do they possess an “actual” health need or 
a “potential” one?
Another question relates to how we ought to classify present pathologies 
that put us at risk of future pathologies. For example, one consequence of 
osteogenesis imperfecta (“brittle bones”) is that it puts one at a higher risk of 
breaking one’s bones in the future than would otherwise be the case. Should 
we therefore consider osteogenesis imperfecta an actual health need, or a 
potential one, or both? We might ask similar questions about immunodefi-
ciency conditions, genetic disorders, and, indeed, a host of pathologies we 
commonly experience.
On reflection, though, it looks like we have the resources to deal with 
both these issues. In response to the first set of cases, then, it seems reason-
able to take an individual’s health as a matter of functioning both at a given 
point in time and over a certain period, with both being indexed to normal 
or species-typical functioning. Thus, we might think that even if a platelet 
count at T
1
 falls within a normal range (e.g., 150,000–450,000 platelets per 
microliter of blood), insofar as we can determine that the platelet count is 
steadily dropping and will shortly fall below the lower limit of that range, or 
is steadily rising and will shortly climb above the higher limit of that range, 
we might similarly conclude that these individuals are presently experien-
cing a harmful deviation from the norm (progressing toward thrombocyto-
penia in the former case and thrombocytosis in the latter). In turn, this 
would suggest that there are at least some actual health needs persons may 
experience by virtue of how their health is deviating from species-typical 
functioning despite the fact that, if we were to take their present health as a 
single time slice, nothing would indicate that their functioning has deviated 
to warrant classification as a pathology.
In response to the second case, it also seems reasonable to think that, in-
sofar as we are currently suffering from a present pathology that puts us at 
risk of future pathologies, we are experiencing both an actual health need 
and a potential health need—or, more properly, we are experiencing an ac-
tual health need, one effect of which is that it engenders a potential health 
need. This might seem to blur the distinction between individuals’ actual 
health needs and their potential health needs. However, to further differen-
tiate the two, it is worth emphasizing here that even if some of our potential 
health needs may be the result of an actual health need, not all are. There 
may be numerous features of our situation which put us at risk of experi-
encing a future pathology other than some pathology we are currently ex-
periencing. Indeed, the current evidence around the social determinants of 
health would appear to suggest that a significant proportion of the health 
risks we face are not the result of our actual health needs. Rather, they are 
features of our physical, social, and economic situation, that is, our work and 
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home environment, the state of the labor market in our area, our access to 
clean water, local agricultural policies, existing social and community net-
works, and so on. The slippery set of stairs outside my office, for example, 
being one such determinant.
We might reasonably talk, therefore, of actual health needs; potential 
health needs; actual health needs that engender potential health need (for 
example, osteogenesis imperfecta); actual health needs that do not engender 
potential health needs (there would appear to be few real-world examples 
here, though it looks like a conceptual possibility); potential health needs 
engendered by actual health needs (e.g., the risk of breaking one’s leg one 
incurs when one suffers from osteogenesis imperfecta); and potential health 
needs that are engendered by features of one’s situation other than one’s 
actual health needs (e.g., the risk of breaking one’s leg when one lives or 
works in an unsafe environment).
Needless to say, like Daniels’ justification of STHC, one thing this account 
does is place a rather large burden on what does and what does not con-
stitute a harmful deviation from normal functioning. Aside from difficulties 
involved in establishing the precise point at which functioning is deviating, 
or has deviated, one lurking issue here is how we ought to understand a 
harmful deviation as opposed to, say, a neutral or even beneficial one. 
Unfortunately, there is not the space to go into these matters here. However, 
it is worth stressing that, even if these issues pose important questions for 
the philosophy of medicine, in practice, the medical community has already 
generated countless guidelines geared towards establishing precisely when 
any given condition becomes an actual health need, which is to say, a pre-
sent deviation from normal functioning is sufficiently harmful to require 
treatment. Thus, even if we lack general answers to these kinds of questions, 
we do not lack for specific ones.
IV. INDIVIDUALS’ ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL HEALTH  
NEEDS AND THE DUTY TO ASSIST
Say we accept that there is a meaningful distinction to be made between 
individuals’ actual health needs and their potential health needs. Still, why 
think this distinction is of any normative significance? Why not talk, as 
Daniels does, about individuals’ health needs in general? The reason that 
this distinction is important, I take it, is because there would appear to be 
certain obligations we are under with respect to meeting one set of health 
needs that do not hold with respect to the other. Specifically, in what follows 
I want to argue that, by virtue of the fact that those experiencing an actual 
health need are less able to help themselves, we have a special duty to as-
sist those experiencing actual health needs, which we do not with respect to 
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this argument requires three things: (a) an account of our normal duty to 
assist, (b) an account detailing the distinction between special duties to as-
sist and normal duties to assist, and (c) an account of why we might have a 
special duty to assist those experiencing an actual health need which does 
not also obtain with respect to those experiencing potential health needs. In 
this section, I set out each of these in turn.
Our Normal Duty to Assist
As I understand it here, our normal duty to assist is an obligation to help 
those experiencing, or at risk of, some kind of harm. Roughly stated, we 
might formulate such a duty in the following way:
Duty to assist (unvarnished version): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening to others, or to rectify a misfortune they are suffering, we ought, 
morally, to do it. (cf. Singer, 1972, 231–2)
Stated thus, the duty to assist can seem appealing. Certainly, it would seem 
somewhat incontrovertible that the fact that others are experiencing, or are 
about to experience, something harmful presents us with a reason to help 
them, or to offer them our assistance, assuming it is within our power to do 
so. However, one problem with unvarnished versions of the duty to assist, 
such as the one set out above, is that they also look far too demanding. In 
fact, they are too demanding. Bad things happen to people all the time. 
Surely, we cannot be morally obliged to be dashing constantly this way and 
that, preventing anything bad from happening to anybody and rectifying 
bad situations wherever we find them? Thus, while the fact that others are 
experiencing, or are about to experience, something harmful would seem 
to present us with a reason to offer them our assistance, it also seems clear 
that there is a host of further features of the moral situation that frequently 
speak against this requirement, features that disable those reasons to act in 
a wide range of cases and thus render the duty to assist less onerous across 
a wide range of cases. If we are to articulate a more plausible formulation 
of the duty to assist, then one thing we need is a clear sense of what these 
kinds of features are.
One thought here might be to say that our obligation to help others is 
disabled if our assistance is not necessary to prevent something bad from 
happening. This is Gewirth’s view (1978, 217–8). Another view, one which 
suggests the obligation to be more demanding (i.e., remains active in a wider 
range of cases), would be to say that we are only freed of our obligation to 
assist when such assistance requires us to sacrifice something of comparable 
moral importance. This is Singer’s view (1972, 231–2). Famously, however, 
Singer stresses that the physical distance between us and the person who 
requires help does not constitute a reason not to assist them, nor does the 







p/article/46/3/272/6295414 by guest on 16 August 2021
fact that others may be in a position to offer their help as well. Thus, as he 
puts it,
It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child 
ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles 
away . . . [or whether] I am the only person who could possibly do anything and 
cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position. (Singer, 1972, 
231–2)
Putting this matter to one side for a moment, it is also worth noting that 
there is another problem here. That is, assuming we can reach an agree-
ment about when we do have a duty to help those experiencing or at risk of 
harm (i.e., when it remains active), there is also the further question of what 
would be the most appropriate means of fulfilling such duties. This might be 
understood as a political, as well as a moral question. That is, assuming that, 
we—as a political, as well as moral community—have a moral obligation to 
prevent bad things from happening to others, or rectify misfortunes they are 
suffering, we might think that how we respond to that duty is something we 
can tackle together, as a political community. Perhaps it would make sense, 
for example, for us to charge the state with fulfilling such obligations on our 
behalf, so that we may get on with other aspects of our lives.6
If we are to realize the duty to assist as a practical principle capable of 
governing our behavior, then, we need clarity on (a) how we are to under-
stand the demands the duty to assist makes on us and in what circumstances 
and (b) what we should do about it once our moral obligations have been 
made clear. However, although these are important questions, I do not at-
tempt to resolve them here.7 Instead, rather than considering what kinds of 
features of a situation might disable existing reasons to help those suffering, 
or about to suffer, some harm, I want to focus on the possibility that there 
may be certain features of a situation that give us additional reasons to help 
than would otherwise be the case, features that render our duty to assist 
more stringent than it would be otherwise, which is to say, less capable of 
being overridden by competing moral considerations (cf. Rumbold, 2019). 
In my way of putting things, cases in which we might be seen to be under 
a “special” duty to assist.
Special Duties to Assist
As intimated above, as I understand it here, we have a special duty to assist 
when certain features of a moral situation render our normal duty to assist 
more stringent than it would be, were it that those features did not obtain. 
The thought here, then, is that we might imagine two kinds of situations in 
which a duty to assist might arise. First, there might be a range of cases in 
which the only morally relevant features of the situation are the fact that 
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disabling features (for example, that assistance would require a sacrifice 
of comparable moral significance) are not present. In these kinds of cases, 
I take it that we have a “normal” or “standard” duty to assist.
However, I also take it that there may be other kinds of cases in which 
there are certain other morally-relevant features present—features beyond 
the fact that someone is experiencing, or at risk of, some kind of harm—that 
give us reason to assist the affected agent over and above whatever reason 
we had by virtue of that individual’s predicament. Now it is in these kinds of 
cases that I want to say we have a “special” obligation to assist. That is, we 
have more reason to assist than we would have had otherwise, and our duty 
to assist is more demanding on our action, which is to say, less defeasible in 
the face of competing considerations.8 The thought here, then, is that where 
a rival consideration, P would present a justification for failing to assist in 
situation x, where the features of the situation are such that we only have a 
normal duty to assist, the same consideration, P, would not present a justi-
fication for failing to assist in situation y, where the features of the situation 
are such that we have a special duty to assist.
Our Special Duty to Assist Those with Actual Health Needs (and Not 
Those with Potential Health Needs)
Using the distinction above between normal and special duties to assist, 
what I want to argue now is that we have a special duty to assist with regard 
to those with actual health needs and that the same is not true with respect 
to those with potential health needs.
Why think, then, that we have a special duty to assist those with actual 
health needs? As indicated above, as I see it, what grounds our special duty 
to assist those with actual health needs is that such needs are debilitative, 
which is to say, that they directly diminish the ability of those who suffer 
from them to meet both those needs and certain other needs.9 In asserting 
that we have a special duty to assist those with actual health needs, it be-
comes necessary to prove two things: that actual health needs are debilita-
tive and that the fact that someone else is unable to help themselves gives 
us a special duty to assist them. Let me deal with these in turn.
Why should one think that actual health needs are debilitative—that is, 
that they directly diminish patients’ ability to meet both these and certain 
other needs? To a certain extent, one might see this as necessarily following 
from what it means to have an actual health need in the first place. As set 
out in Section III, to have an actual health need is to experience a deviation 
from normal functioning, either in the sense that one’s normal functioning 
has deviated or is deviating. If, then, we take our ability to function normally 
as a condition of our being able to meet our needs, we might similarly take 
our experience of an actual health need to undercut directly our ability to 
meet that need, as well as certain other needs we might be experiencing.







p/article/46/3/272/6295414 by guest on 16 August 2021
This argument might be put under pressure in two ways. First, it might be 
argued that our ability to meet our needs is not always dependent on our 
ability to function normally. For example, we might have friends or family 
who are able to help us meet our needs when we are otherwise debilitated. 
In other cases, we may have the necessary resources to insure ourselves 
against future deviations from normal functioning, such that we are able to 
continue to meet our needs even when our functioning is impaired.
Second, one might argue that not all actual health needs—which is to 
say, deviations from normal functioning we are presently experiencing—are 
debilitating in the sense suggested above. Here we might think, for example, 
of various asymptomatic deviations we experience, such as high blood pres-
sure or high cholesterol, which, while clearly actual health needs, do not 
seem to impede our ability to meet that need or any other need.
There are a couple of things we might say in response here. First, insofar 
as the examples in the first counter are cases in which individuals are for-
tunate enough to have the resources (financial or otherwise) to meet their 
needs irrespective of their state of health, it seems clear that they fail to 
present meaningful counter-examples to the present thesis. That is, I take it 
that the purpose of a specialness thesis about health care is primarily to jus-
tify why we have certain moral obligations with respect to the provision of 
health care. One thing the examples in the first counter do is point to occa-
sions where these provisions may not be necessary. However, the mere fact 
that there might be some individuals who are fortunate enough to render 
our obligations in this respect superfluous—they are perfectly capable of 
meeting such needs themselves—is not a reason to think that we have no 
obligations in the first place and, more importantly, no obligations with re-
spect to those less fortunate than they. Thus, cases in which individuals may 
be able to meet their needs irrespective of their ability to function normally 
look largely irrelevant to the argument being made here.10
The second counter is more challenging. To begin with, the central claim 
made by the counter is clearly true: not all actual health needs do seem to 
be debilitating in the way intimated above. Moreover, as well as the pos-
sibility of there being at least some non-debilitative actual health needs, it 
also seems clear that some actual health needs will be less debilitating than 
others. Thus, insofar as the present thesis attempts to ground the normative 
significance of health care on the debilitating effects of individuals’ actual 
health needs, these facts present an important limitation to the scope of that 
argument. However, there are a few things to say in mitigation here. First, 
the fact that some actual health needs are more debilitating than others does 
not undermine the logic of the current argument, it simply suggests that 
there is a further level of granularity at which we might assess the norma-
tive significance of different needs: not all debilitative actual health needs 
are necessarily on a par.11 Second, while it may be true that there are some 
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in number. Indeed, one thing that it may be worth emphasizing here is 
that, in order to qualify as an actual health need on the current conception, 
the deviation one experiences from normal functioning must be a harmful 
one. Thus, any benign or neutral asymptomatic deviation from normal func-
tioning would fail to qualify as non-debilitating actual health needs, as they 
would first fail to qualify as an actual health need. This leaves, of course, an 
important class of harmful asymptomatic deviations from normal functions 
left outside the scope of the present thesis, and with respect to these, one 
is simply forced to concede that the present argument provides no justifi-
cation for their moral significance. However, even here, it is important to 
note that simply because such needs are not covered by the present justifi-
cation of STHC does not necessarily mean that we have no good reason to 
remedy them.
Accepting, therefore, that not all actual health needs are necessarily 
debilitating, we might still conclude that the vast majority are (to a greater 
or lesser extent). Still, even if we think that (many) actual health needs are 
debilitating, why think that this fact about them grounds a special duty 
to assist?
Perhaps the first thing to say is that I take it for granted that, when others 
are experiencing an actual health need, we at least have a normal duty to 
assist. That is, provided certain disabling conditions do not apply, the fact 
that others are experiencing harmful deviations from normal functioning that 
require intervention would appear to present us with reason enough to help 
them, or to offer them our assistance, assuming it is within our power to do 
so. The further thought here, then, is that insofar as someone is experiencing 
an actual health need, the fact that that need is also a debilitating one—it 
renders them less able to help themselves—gives us additional reasons to 
help them, over and above those reasons we have by virtue of the harm they 
are experiencing. In other words, there is a special duty to assist.
That individuals’ (in)ability to help themselves affects our duty to assist in 
this way follows, I believe, from how responsibilities for meeting needs are 
distributed among the field of possible responders. Here, it is worth recalling 
that on this precise point Singer sticks closely to a principle of equity. Thus, 
on his view, the duty to assist (rendered in terms of a duty to rescue) “makes 
no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could pos-
sibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the 
same position” (Singer, 1972, 231–2). On this view, then, our responsibility to 
assist is neither shared between whoever can assist, nor held by some agents 
to a greater degree than others. Rather, it binds each possible respondent 
equally, each having equal reason to help (see also, Unger, 1996).12
I am pretty sympathetic to this view. However, even if we might agree 
that the duty to assist falls equally on all possible respondents other than the 
agent suffering the need, it would still seem to be the case that, insofar as 
any agent, P, suffers a need, x, the duty to meet x falls first and foremost on 
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P. To suggest otherwise would seem hopelessly alienating. That is, it would 
seem to imply that the way my life goes is as much your responsibility as it 
is mine, that my life is not, in a sense, my own—or, at least, no more mine 
than it is yours.
If we assume, then, that insofar as any agent P suffers a need x, the duty 
to meet x falls first and foremost on P, we can begin to see why it would 
be morally relevant whether or not P is able to help himself. For where P is 
able to help himself, even though the mere fact that P has a need gives us 
sufficient reason to help him, we might also think that the responsibility for 
meeting x remains, first and foremost, P’s. Correspondingly, where P is un-
able to help himself, the responsibility for meeting x increasingly becomes 
our responsibility. We have additional reasons to help than would be the 
case otherwise, or, to put it another way, a special duty to assist.13
Since we have already established, then, that, in (most) cases, to experi-
ence an actual health need is to experience a condition such that one is less 
able to help oneself, we might similarly conclude that insofar as an indi-
vidual suffers from a debilitating actual health need, we have a special duty 
to lend that person our assistance.
From this, then, I take it that we have certain special duties to lend our 
assistance to those with actual health needs (assuming no disabling factors 
apply). Here, though, we might ask: is the same true of our duties with re-
spect to individuals’ potential health needs? To this I want to argue: no.
Before making this argument it is perhaps important to note that the fact 
that others are experiencing a potential health need does appear to give us 
an ordinary duty to assist. That is, provided certain disabling conditions do 
not apply, the fact that others are at risk of experiencing deviations from 
normal functioning that require intervention would appear to present us 
with reason enough to help them, or to offer them our assistance, assuming 
it is within our power to do so.
However, at the same time, individuals’ potential health needs do not ap-
pear to present us with a special obligation to assist—at least on the same 
grounds as our obligation to assist those with actual health needs. This is 
for the simple reason that unlike (almost all) actual health needs, potential 
health needs are not debilitating, that is, they do not directly diminish our 
ability to meet them or any other need. Again, the reasons for this are simple 
enough. Namely, when one experiences a potential health need, one does 
not experience any deviation in one’s normal functioning. Rather, one only 
experiences the risk of experiencing such deviations at some point in the 
future. As such, although we might think we have a ordinary duty to meet 
individuals’ potential health needs, that any given individual is experiencing 
a potential health need does not appear to ground the same special duty to 
assist that held with respect to individuals’ actual health needs.14
Following the arguments laid out above, then, we seem to have good 
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needs and their potential health needs are nonidentical: we have at least 
some special duties to meet individuals’ actual health needs that we do not 
have with respect to their potential health needs. However, if we are to es-
tablish STHC, we still need to know why our duties with regard to individ-
uals’ actual health needs entail that we have any particular obligations with 
regard to the distribution of health care (as opposed to any other good), and 
why such duties might counsel against the distribution of health care based 
on ability to pay. It is to these questions that I turn in the next section.
V. THE DUTY TO MEET INDIVIDUALS’ ACTUAL  
HEALTH NEEDS AND HEALTH CARE
Having established that we have a special duty to meet individuals’ actual 
health needs, in order to defend STHC we require two further things: first, 
an account of why our duty to meet individuals’ actual health needs has 
any particular significance for the distribution of health care as opposed to 
any other kind of good, and second, an account of why our duties with re-
gard to meeting individuals’ actual health needs demand that we distribute 
healthcare resources irrespective of individuals’ ability to pay.
The reason, I  take it, that our duty to meet individuals’ actual health 
needs has a particular significance for the way we distribute health care, as 
opposed to any other good, is that those goods and services traditionally 
recognized as healthcare goods are also those goods best placed to remedy 
individuals’ actual health needs. What this relies on is the idea that when we 
are under a duty to assist, what assistance we give, and how we give it is not 
open. Rather, if the assistance we offer is to be a proper response, it needs 
to be one that we have good reason to believe will actually alleviate the 
need felt by its recipient. When it comes to our duty to assist with respect to 
individuals’ actual health needs, then the proper response is to provide the 
afflicted parties with whatever goods and services are most likely to arrest or 
mitigate any pathologies they are experiencing. Here, I contend that, in the 
main, these goods are those we usually classify as healthcare goods.
There may be, perhaps, certain cases of goods that we do not normally 
recognize as healthcare goods which give us pause on this point. Some 
studies, for example, have found that animal interaction can help improve 
depressive symptoms and bring about significant decreases in blood pres-
sure values (Stasi et al., 2004; Le Roux and Kemp, 2009). Are we to assume, 
therefore, that pets ought to be classified as healthcare goods? Or, alterna-
tively, that not all goods that meet actual health needs are special? I tend to 
take the former horn of this dilemma. That is, it seems fairly intuitive to me 
that insofar as we have good reason to think that any particular good can 
be used to meet an actual health need, then we ought to consider it as a 
healthcare good, even if it is not usually recognized as such. What this means, 
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of course, is that the definition of what constitutes a “healthcare good” with 
which we started—namely, all those goods and services typically covered 
by a comprehensive public health service (cf. Daniels, 2008)—is no longer 
strictly true. Rather, under pressure from these kinds of examples, we might 
better understand “health care” to denote any good or service we know to 
be capable of meeting an actual health need, a set which would clearly in-
clude most goods and services typically covered by a comprehensive public 
health service but may also include certain other goods and services, the 
therapeutic value of which is not yet recognized by such systems.
More importantly, however, it is worth stressing here that one set of goods 
and services not covered by the present thesis (or the definition of health care 
above) is the vast majority of the goods other than health care which Daniels 
(and others) recognize as meeting health needs in general—including, for 
example, those relating to housing, sanitation, education, transport, and so 
on. This is because, while such goods and services might be enormously 
important in helping us meet individuals’ potential health needs (and hence, 
there is a sense in which they help us meet individuals’ health needs in 
general), they are not usually particularly well suited to helping us meet in-
dividuals’ actual health needs. Indeed, as emphasized in Section II, this has 
always been recognized by those advocating a greater focus on social deter-
minants of health. Thus, as Wilkinson and Marmot emphasize, the point of 
such interventions is that they help prevent people from becoming ill, not 
that they are necessarily of any use when people are ill (2003, 7). For those 
kinds of needs—what I have been calling individuals’ actual health needs—
what we require is health care. Insofar, then, as the present thesis defends 
the moral significance of all those goods that meet individuals’ actual health 
needs, it likewise asserts the moral significance of healthcare goods and 
healthcare goods only, effectively remaining silent on the moral significance 
(or otherwise) of any other kind of good, even those goods which we know 
help us in meeting individuals’ potential health needs. In this way, then, the 
present defense of STHC avoids the social determinants of health objection.
Let us assume, then, that the proper response to individuals’ actual health 
needs, given our special obligations to assist those unable to help them-
selves, is to provide health care, and health care only. Still, we might ask, 
why should our obligations in this respect entail that we ought to distribute 
health care separately from how other social goods are distributed, and 
wealth in particular?
What justifies this approach, I contend, is a tendency in our duty to assist 
to default towards equity; which is to say, that prior to any further consid-
eration about whom we ought to assist, our duty to assist presumes that we 
ought to treat each of our fellow human beings as equal potential recipients 
of our assistance. One place we might see this, perhaps, is in Singer’s claim 
that the duty to assist (or rescue) makes no account of proximity or distance. 
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is a neighbor’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall 
never know, ten thousand miles away.” One assumption behind Singer’s 
reasoning—to which I am sympathetic—is the thought that insofar as the 
duty to assist applies to anybody, it should generally be taken to apply to 
everybody. If, then, we are to identify certain agents as more deserving of 
our assistance than others, we need to have good reason to do so. By a 
similar line of thought, we might argue that, if our special obligation to meet 
individuals’ actual health needs applies to anyone, it applies to everyone. 
From here, then, if one were to argue that health care ought to be provided 
on the basis of ability to pay, one would need to show why those with a 
greater (or lesser!) ability to pay are more deserving of our assistance than 
others. Since, though, I know of no good argument in defense of this pos-
ition, the default position would appear to provide health care—to fulfill our 
special duty to assist with respect to other’s actual health needs—independ-
ently of their possession of this or that social good. In short, our obligation 
is to treat health care as special.
VI. OBJECTIONS, REPLIES, AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Before concluding, let me briefly respond to a few possible objections. One 
worry we may have about the present thesis, perhaps, is that, like the de-
fense of STHC from utility, it can look too wide. Insofar as the present thesis 
grounds STHC on the fact that actual health needs tend to be debilitating, 
we might wonder whether the same argument could be used to defend the 
“specialness” of other goods meeting other kinds of debilitating needs. Our 
need for food, for example, would sometimes appear to undercut our ability 
to meet that need. Would it then follow that we ought to distribute food in-
dependently of ability to pay?
On this point, I  find myself fairly willing to bite the bullet: yes, it does 
follow. However, let me say two things that may mitigate the force of this 
objection. First, as noted in the introduction, to defend STHC is not neces-
sarily to claim that health care is uniquely special, that is, that it is the only 
good that ought to be distributed independently of ability to pay. Rather, to 
defend the specialness of health care, we only need to show that it is among 
a minority of goods that we should consider special. To say, then, that the 
present thesis makes a range of other goods special in the same sense that it 
makes health care special is not necessarily an embarrassment to the theory, 
so long as it does not suggest that too many other social goods are special in 
the way health care is (as, perhaps, the justification from utility does).
Second, to the extent that the present theory suggests that other goods 
ought to be treated as special in the same way as health care, I argue that, 
in most cases, such a conclusion often reflects our normal intuitions about 
their distribution as well. One’s need for food would appear a good example 
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of this. That is, in those instances where an individual’s need for food does 
become debilitating—that is, where that need begins to undermine an 
individual’s ability to meet their needs—I think we often think it would be 
wrong to distribute food according to ability to pay. In this way, then, al-
though the present theory may be wide in the sense of making more goods 
special than just health care, it is not too wide, in the sense of making more 
goods special than we would normally expect.
Another, opposite worry that one might have regarding the present thesis 
is that it is too narrow, that it does not make enough goods special. For ex-
ample, much of what a modern health service does would usually fall under 
the category of “preventive” health care, or “public health.” However, insofar 
as the present thesis only defends the specialness of those goods meeting 
actual, as opposed to potential, health needs, it fails to account for the spe-
cialness of these kinds of services. Moreover, as highlighted in Section V, the 
present thesis also fails to account for the moral significance of any actual 
health needs that are nondebilitating. In this way, then, one might think 
that the present theory is too narrow in that it fails to account for the moral 
significance and “specialness” of all goods we would normally recognize as 
healthcare goods.
On the one hand, I am ready to accept the present theory’s limitations in 
this regard. However, I do not think that such narrowness necessarily pre-
sents a decisive objection in the same way it did, say, with respect to the 
“life-saving” justification of STHC. That is, I take it that the reason why the 
charge of narrowness was so potent in that case was that the theory failed to 
justify the specialness of many of the services we would usually recognize as 
health care. However, while the present thesis fails to justify the specialness 
of all goods we recognize as healthcare goods—and this is an important 
limitation—it is still able to account for the specialness of at least the ma-
jority of healthcare goods. In a way, then, while the present defense of STHC 
might be considered narrower than we would otherwise like, it does not 
seem so narrow as to be redundant.
Moreover, for those who are concerned, the present thesis suggests that all 
goods meeting potential health needs are not special, there are two things 
worth pointing out. First, simply because the present theory does not account 
for the specialness of various preventive healthcare services, that does not 
necessarily entail that such services ought to be distributed according to 
ability to pay, or, indeed, that they are not special for reasons other than the 
ones discussed here. Rather, it only means that we have no reason to treat 
such goods differently from any other by the tenets of this particular theory. 
Assuming, then, that other theories of justice are able to account for more 
egalitarian distributions where this one does not, one can still be confident 
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Second, in defending the specialness thesis about health care, the present 
theory does not suggest that meeting individuals’ actual health needs are, 
all things considered, more important than meeting their potential health 
needs—and thus that the goods by which we might meet actual health needs 
are more important than those meeting potential health needs. Indeed, it 
may be that, when we come to consider all the demands on our action, 
we find that in several cases we ought to meet individuals’ potential health 
needs before their actual health needs. Again, as noted in the introduction, 
to say that health care is special is not to say that it is more important than 
other goods, let  alone that it is the chief good. Rather, it is only that we 
have certain moral obligations with respect to ensuring individuals’ access to 
health care that we do not have with respect to other social goods, and that 
one of the things that such obligations require is that we ensure individuals 
have access to health care irrespective of their possession of this or that so-
cial good—wealth in particular.15
Does this response rob the present theory of any argumentative force? 
After all, if we think that, despite everything that has been said so far, it may 
turn out that we ought, all things considered, to meet individuals’ potential 
health needs before their actual health needs, what work is done by as-
serting that health care is special? However, there are two things it is worth 
stressing here. First, the concession that, in certain circumstances, we may 
have good reason to meet individuals’ potential health needs before their 
actual health needs is not equivalent to saying that the two are morally on 
a par. Rather, the present thesis would still suggest that there are important 
normative asymmetries with respect to the two kinds of need, obligations 
which entail that, all other things being equal, we have more reasons to meet 
individuals’ actual health needs than we do their potential health needs. 
Acknowledging that all other things are not always equal does not undercut 
the importance of this finding; it only registers that the present justification 
of STHC is not the last word when it comes to the provision and distribution 
of health care.
Second, it is worth emphasizing that for those who are not persuaded by 
other theories asserting moral significance of individuals’ potential health 
needs (say, on the grounds of their significance with respect to opportunity), 
the present theory provides independent grounds for thinking that, none-
theless, we ought to treat health care as a special good. In this way, then, it 
might be seen to preserve the specialness of health care in the face of any 
skepticism about the specialness of other goods meeting health needs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite its intuitive appeal, philosophers have often struggled to justify the 
idea that we ought to treat health care differently from other sorts of social 
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goods. Indeed, even among those who, like Daniels, subscribe to the view 
that all goods that meet health needs are special, there is little support for 
the idea that health care has some further significance that continues to 
differentiate it from other goods meeting health needs. In this article, how-
ever, I have pushed back on this line of thought. I have argued that we 
still have good reason to treat health care as special, even over and above 
whatever reasons we might have to treat other goods that meet health needs 
as special. What justifies this treatment is a normative asymmetry between 
our obligations with respect to individuals’ actual health needs and our ob-
ligations with respect to individuals’ potential health needs. Specifically, by 
virtue of the fact that (almost all) actual health needs are debilitative, we 
have a special obligation to assist those experiencing them, something that 
is not true with respect to individuals’ potential health needs. This does not 
entail that we have no reason to meet individuals’ potential health needs. It 
does, though, suggest that our obligations with respect to the distribution of 
health care are different from those with respect to many other goods, even 
other goods by which we might meet individuals’ general health needs, and 
that, by virtue of such obligations, we have a duty to provide individuals’ 
experiencing actual health needs with health care and to distribute it inde-
pendently of ability to pay—in other words, to treat it as “special.”
As flagged in the introduction to this article, one important question left 
open by the present analysis is what we ought to do about the fact we have 
this obligation, now that we recognize that we have it. As suggested in 
Section IV, I believe there are good reasons to think that this is a political, 
as well as moral question. However, my aim here has primarily been to get 
clear on our moral obligations with regard to health care. Insofar, then, as 
these sorts of questions take us beyond the scope of our present enquiry, 
I am content, for the moment, to leave them open.
NOTES
 1. I take this description of the specialness thesis about health care (STHC) to be broadly congruent 
with how it is typically understood in the literature; notably, Segall’s definition of STHC as the claim that 
health care is “morally important in ways that justify distributing medical resources in isolation from the 
way in which other social goods, and wealth in particular, are distributed” (Segall, 2007; cf. Segall, 2010), 
and Daniels’ definition of STHC as the claim that health care is “morally important in ways that justify 
(and explain) the fact that many societies distribute health care more equally than many other social 
goods” (Daniels, 2001).
 2. I take this group to be comprised of writers united by their denial of health care’s specialness, 
even if they are dissociated by their position on what wider theory of distributive justice obtains. It in-
cludes, therefore, writers who see justice as best served by free-market exchanges and deny health care’s 
specialness in respect to such a theory (Friedman, 1991; Narveson, 2006, 372); those who see distributive 
justice as constrained by duties of beneficence and deny health care’s specialness in respect to such a 
theory (Buchanan, 1991, 180); those who adopt a broadly Rawlsian view of distributive justice and deny 
health care’s specialness in respect to such a theory (Peter, 2001); those who see distributive justice as a 
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theory (Fried, 1978, 127; Pogge, 1989, 181–96; Dworkin, 1993, 886); and those who see distributive justice 
as a matter of equality of opportunity for welfare or luck egalitarianism and deny health care’s specialness 
in respect to such a theory (Segall, 2010).
 3. For other writers adopting similar positions, see, for example, Anand (2002), Sen (2002), 
Nussbaum (1992, 214).
 4. The significance of our duty to assist those in need of medical attention has largely been ignored 
by the secondary literature around STHC (although it is familiar in the literature around health care else-
where—see, for example, Jonsen, 1986, 172–4; Sheehan, 2007, 352–66). However, one place where it has 
been raised, perhaps, is in discussions about our “duty to care.” For example, Culyer and Pauly suggest 
that there may be, in effect, two demands for health care: first, those demands made by a given individual 
(for preventive care when well and for cure, prevention of deterioration, or reduction in the speed of de-
terioration of health when sick), and, second, those demands created by “the rest of society,” who have 
a desire to “care” for that individual and express their “sympathy” or “solidarity” with them (Culyer, 1971, 
1993, 299–300; Pauly, 1971). This thought has also recently been picked up by Daniel Engster (2014), 
who argues that “care . . . the other half of health care . . . provides the best reason for states to con-
tinue subsidizing comprehensive health services.” Unfortunately, I think that Engster’s care-justification 
of STHC ultimately fails, and fails on much the same grounds that previous justifications of STHC have 
(Rumbold, 2017). There are, however, a number of points of congruity between the justification of STHC 
laid out in this paper and Engster’s, and, hence, I take them to be working toward similar ends.
 5. Here Daniels draws on Christopher Boorse’s (1975) seminal work on disease as a harmful de-
parture from normal functioning, understood in a statistical sense.
 6. There are those who would be unlikely to find this idea attractive. For example, anyone sub-
scribing to a libertarian or Nozickean conception of a minimal state—that is, one limited to defense, 
police, and the administration of justice—would be likely to resist the idea that we may legitimately task 
the state with fulfilling moral obligations like our duty to assist. Interestingly, though, the situation is not 
necessarily straightforward here. That is, given Nozick’s account that we are justified in employing pri-
vate protective associations—and eventually the state—to uphold our rights, it is not clear that he would 
necessarily object to employing the same bodies to fulfill our imperfect, or unipolar duties. Perhaps the 
libertarian might respond that it would be entirely permissible for individuals to task private bodies—or 
even the state—to undertake that function if they so wish; but one thing they would never accept is 
the idea that the state may compel those who do not want to subscribe to such an arrangement to con-
tribute in any case (e.g., through general taxation). This may well bring us to an impasse. However, it at 
least clarifies the grounds of the disagreement, namely, as revolving around the idea that the state may 
legitimately compel citizens to (a) fulfill certain kinds of ethical obligations and (b) fulfill them through 
subscription to existing state mechanisms.
 7. For other work that has reflected on these kinds of issues, see, for example, Herman (2001).
 8. Unfortunately, the language here can be a little distracting. That is, when we normally talk about 
Q’s “special obligations” to P, what we mean are those obligations Q owes to P by virtue of some special 
relationship between them. Here we might think, for example, of parents’ obligations to their child, or 
obligations arising from a contract. However, as intimated above, I take the notion of a “special duty to 
assist” to have a broader meaning than this. That is, as I understand it, we have a “special” duty to φ 
whenever there are certain features of a moral situation that give us additional reasons to φ other than 
the reasons to φ we already have. This might, therefore, include reasons engendered by virtue of some 
special relationship between P and Q, but it is not necessarily limited by such reasons.
 9. It is perhaps worth noting here that in saying this, I do not rule out the possibility that there 
are other features of experiencing a health need that might also ground a special duty to assist beyond 
the fact that they render their sufferer less able to help themselves. For example, one might think that 
the fact that an actual health need currently affects the sufferers gives us reason to help them, over and 
above those cases in which the harm is simply something that the sufferer may, or may not, incur in the 
future—as is the case with respect to potential health needs. In this particular case, my view is that such 
features do not necessarily give us more (as in different) reasons to assist, but rather only augment those 
reasons to assist we already have; principally because whether they are merely at risk of incurring one, 
our reason for assisting is still the same—namely, the harm they are suffering (or will suffer). Hence, to 
my mind at least, the fact that an actual health need is something the sufferer is presently experiencing 
does not look like kind of the feature that would engender a special duty to assist. However, whether 
such features are capable of grounding a special duty to assist or not is largely moot at this point, since, 
for the purposes of my argument, my only aim is to show that there is at least one feature that is capable 
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of grounding a special duty to assist: namely, the fact that, insofar as one experiences an actual health 
need, one is typically also rendered less able to help oneself.
 10. There is, perhaps, an interesting question here about whether the mere fact that some are able 
to insure themselves against future needs, or to meet their needs despite their ill health, undercuts or “dis-
ables” our obligations to them. We might also wonder about the case of the ascetic, who does not con-
sider the inability to meet certain needs as problematic. However, to the extent that these issues take us 
beyond the scope of the present paper, considering what, if anything, might mitigate against our special 
obligations to assist, I do not consider them further here.
 11. It is worth noting here that something similar might be said of almost all justifications of STHC. 
On Daniels’ revised justification of the specialness of all those goods meeting health needs, for example, 
it seems clear some “general” health needs necessarily present a greater obstacle to individuals’ normal 
opportunity range than others.
 12. For an interesting counter, see Miller (2013, 194–8).
 13. For some, of course, this whole discussion might seem to get the moral situation back-to-front. 
For example, if we were to think, along with Gewirth, that we only have a duty to assist if our assistance 
is necessary to prevent the relevant harm, and we take individuals’ inability to help themselves as one 
of the conditions that would make our assistance “necessary,” we might also think that we have no duty 
to assist except when individuals are unable to help themselves. However, I remain unpersuaded by this 
line of argument. This is in part because one thing that this position assumes is that where individuals 
are able to help themselves, the fact that they are also in need provides us with no reason to help them 
whatsoever. As intimated above, though, contrary to this view, I argue that, in such situations, we still 
have a reason to help parties in need; it is simply that we have at least one less reason to assist them than 
we would have had, had they been unable to help themselves.
 14. One thing that this leaves open, of course, is the possibility that we might have certain special 
duties to meet individuals’ potential health needs that we do not with respect to individuals’ actual health 
needs. However, since this article is devoted to exploring the justifiability of the claim that health care is 
special, rather than any other good or goods, I leave this possibility unexplored here.
 15. See Segall (2007).
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